NavWeek: Fund Foolish

Assistant U.S. Navy Secretary James Thomsen floated a rather unique perspective on competition earlier this month.

During the annual Naval Submarine League Symposium, Thomsen, the service’s principal civilian deputy, said, “We’re all competing against the budget.”

And it is that competition, he says, that is keeping a lid on costs as the service and contractors strive to develop and build the Pentagon’s most expensive submarines, ships and other platforms.

In theory, that sounds good -– and Thomsen’s probably right as far as that goes. The problem is that the budget is rigged -– rigged by rigid lines of thinking that gs back to the Cold War or even earlier, when U.S. naval, land and air forces all split the pie evenly, as if service operations all rank the same in importance at any given time.

But we all know that isn’t true and this is as good a time as any to have a serious debate on what the nation really wants and needs. In the throes of an Asia-Pacific rebalance, the U.S. now is starting to design the ballistic-missile submarines it needs to replace the Ohio class, bolstering ballistic missile defense (BMD) for its own forces and that of its allies. Those supposedly are the priorities for the Pentagon and the nation now.

If that is the case, then the U.S. should really recarve its funding stream.  If the strategic submarine force is the most important shipbuilding program, the nation should find the funds, or even create a national fund, to back up that desire.  The same goes if the country feels the need to buy more bombers and missiles. (Although many in the Pentagon still make the argument that the subs are the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad and carry the most firepower.)

The rebalance to the Asia-Pacific represents an even clearer choice. There’s a reason why the region is named after the world’s largest body of water. By nature, it is maritime. It is naval. If the U.S. is serious about this shift, its funding streams should reflect it. You just can’t beef up your naval force in such an expansive and expensive region of the world without providing the money to make it possible.  To expect the U.S. Navy to lead the way back into the Pacific with the same amount of funding it has had -– while possibly paying for a new strategic sub fleet and building a larger fleet of destroyers with greater BMD capability -–  simply does not make sense.

U.S. military officers are fond of saying: “The enemy gets a vote.” Just because it’s a cliché doesn’t make it any less true. Do U.S. adversaries –- current or future, national or non-state -– short-sheet their funding simply to satisfy historical totems?  They invest where they need to.

There’s an old Spartan maxim, somewhat paraphrased, that goes: Money is the sinew of any serious undertaking. Unfortunately, it seems U.S. military intentions are weakened by flabby and outdated thinking.