The U.S. Air Force’s future refueling aircraft, beyond the KC-46 and upcoming bridge tanker, should get smaller, focus solely on refueling and rely more on automation to be more effective in a high-end, Pacific war scenario, a new think tank report argues.
The Hudson Institute, in an analysis of future refueling requirements released Nov. 15, argues that the Air Force should do away with the cargo role for the future tanker, dropping the “C” off of the planned KC-Z so the aircraft can reduce its size, be more efficient, and offload fuel at range. The study’s authors, Hudson experts Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton, present an example, the “K-Z(M).” It is a 95,000-lb. tanker, about half the size of a KC-46 and smaller than the KC-135. The aircraft would carry about 140,000 lb. of fuel and take up much less ramp space than the larger legacy tankers. The Air Force should avoid expensive research on trying to make the aircraft low-observable and instead focus on autonomy and defenses.
“By adopting a balanced approach to survivability, the K-Z(M) could leverage a medium-sized fuselage, signature management best practices and robust protection systems to allow it to operate slightly inside contested areas,” the report says. “Because it would remain outside highly contested areas and could defend itself against some missile threats, the K-Z(M) would not require a highly stealthy design, and its [research, development, test and evaluation] and procurement costs could be reduced relative to a more sophisticated aircraft.”
Though the U.S. Navy has made progress with its carrier-based autonomous Boeing MQ-25 small tanker, an aircraft of that size would not be of use to the Air Force. The MQ-25 can only carry enough fuel to support two fighters, while a medium-sized tanker could refuel six F-35s or a P-8 to a distance of 3,000 nm, while also being able to refuel itself from a KC-46 or a Lockheed Martin LMXT, the other entrant in the Air Force’s “bridge tanker” program.
Removing the need to carry cargo and using an aerodynamically efficient shape, such as a blended/hybrid wing body or flying wing, the proposed aircraft would be able to have a longer range and could fit in more austere airfields, the report argues.
The Air Force has not started developing its requirements for the future KC-Z, with Air Mobility Command (AMC) conducting studies on what characteristics it would like to see on the aircraft. These could include autonomy, weapons, potential stealth, and more command and control, among others.
The service is refining its acquisition strategy and requirements for the interim “bridge tanker,” which would come online between the last delivery of ordered KC-46s in 2029 and the future KC-Z. The entrants for this program are the KC-46, which would not require more R&D funding and take up less ramp space, and the LMXT, which is larger and can offload more fuel at range. Air Force Lt. Gen. Clinton Hinote, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for strategy, integration and requirements, said in September that the requirements for the bridge tanker would largely mirror those for the KC-Y program, which Boeing won with the KC-46. But the KC-Z would reimagine what a refueling tanker can be.
The Hudson Institute study argues the Air Force should improve its refueling fleet’s command-and-control capabilities to better the fleet’s efficiency and support new operational concepts, such as Joint All Domain Command and Control. AMC is pursuing this, with the integration of new data links on its aircraft and an Oct. 1 request to industry to determine what beyond-line-of-sight data services are available to install on tankers and airlifters.
Changes to how the Air Force fuels its aircraft are not needed just in the air, with the study saying the U.S. military needs to address its fuel infrastructure at bases across the Pacific by hardening its stores and increasing base access across the entire region.
“Absent reform, in a conflict with China, the tanker fleet may be confined to about a dozen airfields where U.S. forces would have political access and sufficient runway, ramp space, and fuel stores to support refueling operations,” the authors write. “Such a force could only support relatively few aircraft in the air and would be more vulnerable to attack compared to a more distributed fleet.”
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