A Pentagon investigation into the Aug. 29 drone strike in Kabul that killed 10 Afghan civilians calls for changes to how future airstrikes are handled but says those involved in conducting the strike did not violate any laws of war and simply made a mistake.
The MQ-9 strike targeted what U.S. officials believed was an ISIS-Khorasan target with a vehicle full of weapons—an imminent threat to troops and civilians at the Kabul airport. The target was actually an aid worker returning to his home, and the AGM-114 Hellfire strike killed three men and seven children.
Air Force Inspector General Lt. Gen. Sami Said, who was tapped to lead an investigation into the strike, told reporters Nov. 3 that although the incident was a mistake, those involved in the decision-making process believed it was an imminent threat and “confirmation bias” meant no one questioned if the strike was proper.
“I found, given the information they have and the analysis they did … it was not unreasonable, it just turned out to be incorrect,” Said told reporters. “So, my point is, we’ve had mistakes in the conduct of military operations. Unfortunately, we’ll have others in the future. The issue here is to figure out what we could have done better to make sure this never happens again.”
The strike happened three days after the suicide bombing at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), which killed 13 U.S. troops and scores of Afghan civilians. Intelligence presented to the MQ-9 operators and those in the target cells led them to believe the target they followed was another ISIS-K threat. For example, intelligence pointed to a compound where the man visited being an ISIS-K facility and some materials he handled looked like they could have been bombs. The HKIA suicide bomber used a computer bag full of explosives, and surveillance showed the man carrying a computer bag when he visited his office. This all added to the surety of those in the strike cell that the target was correct, and the compounding confirmation bias meant no one objected.
It was not until after the Hellfire was released that the MQ-9 crews and strike cell saw children emerge, according to the investigation. When investigators reviewed the footage specifically looking for children in the compound, they were visible for a full 2 min. before the missile was fired. However, the crews were not looking as closely at the time in the compound, Said claimed.
The Aug. 29 strike was in self-defense, as opposed to a more common targeted strike. The latter means forces have more time to develop a pattern of life for the target, evaluate intelligence and ensure less collateral damage. Though ISR assets tracked the target for 8 hr., the forces felt they needed to act quickly, Said said.
“It’s a very different construct and very different execution,” he said. “So, I wouldn’t conclude anything from this particular strike, which was very unique to the norm that is exercised with over-the-horizon [counterterrorism] strikes.”
The report outlines three steps the military should take in future time-constrained scenarios:
• Implementing new procedures to mitigate risks of confirmation bias.
• Enhancing sharing of overall mission situational awareness during execution, including outside of the direct cell that decides to conduct a strike.
• A review of prestrike procedures used to assess the presence of civilians.
In the case of the Aug. 29 strike, a “red team”-type presence in the strike cell who can take a more critical look at the intelligence could help break the confirmation bias and have the cell think more critically about the target, Said told reporters.
The review and recommendations have been presented to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and commanders with U.S. Central Command and Special Operations Command. The Pentagon has said it is attempting to pay reparations to the family of those killed in the incident.
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