B-21
Australia’s defense budget this year is $33 billion (A$48.7 billion). About 23% of that budget is allocated to buying equipment, of which the top spenders now include new fleets of 72 F-35As, nine Hunter-class (Type 26) frigates, 14 P-8As and 211 Boxer armored fighting vehicles. Canberra’s investment portfolio is deep, but possibly not complete.
An ongoing Defense Security Review led by Stephen Smith and Angus Houston is reportedly considering the acquisition of the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider within the next decade. A newly released 56-page report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) recommends as “worthy of further examination” an estimated $16.9-$18.9 billion (A$25-28 billion) proposal to buy 12 stealth bombers, enough to stand up one squadron on Australian soil.
The authors–ASPI senior analyst Marcus Hellyer and Andrew Nicholls, a former senior advisor to Australian defense ministers–acknowledge a proposal to spend the equivalent of roughly half of Australia’s annual defense budget over the next 10 years on a dozen aircraft is provocative. They concede there may be other solutions than an Australian-owned fleet of stealth bombers. But a B-21 acquisition remains intriguing in Canberra.
“Things that were previously inconceivable are now happening, so we shouldn’t dismiss the B-21 out of hand. Our recommendation is that the Australian government should engage with the U.S. government to gain access to the information on the B-21 program so they can make an informed decision on its viability for Australia,” Hellyer and Nicholls write.
The ASPI report identifies a key issue facing the Australian military. China has built military bases on reclaimed land in the South China Sea, which is part of what Australia calls its “near region.” If the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) deploys medium-range bombers and ballistic missile launchers to those bases, China could strike targets all over Australia. Moreover, the PLA Navy sailed a Luyang-class destroyer through the strait between the northern tip of Queensland and Papua New Guinea earlier this year, demonstrating a show of force by a ship with the capability to fire 64 missiles.
“Without striking range, we’re simply adopting a defensive posture and absorbing punishment,” Hellyer and Nicholls write.
But Australia lacks such striking range. The Hunter-class frigates will not arrive until at least 2033, and all 32 missile cells aboard may be needed for air defense. Even with a single, inflight refueling and relying on internal weapons, the F-35A lacks the range to strike targets in the South China Sea from Australia. According to Hellyer’s analysis, U.S.-supplied nuclear-powered submarines will not arrive until the 2040s, raising the question of how Australia copes with a striking range gap in the interim.
The authors consider ground-launched missiles, such as the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon, but conclude its reportedly $40 million price tag per unit renders it more expensive than a penetrating bomber using cheaper munitions during a long air campaign against an advanced adversary. Australia’s B-21 squadron could be purchased for about the same price as 425 LRHW missiles.
Another option reviewed by the report is loading C-130Js with palletized munitions. But firing a load of 24 JASSM-ERs worth about $40 million combined is also unsustainable, even if tactical airlifters can be spared from their primary mission to strike distant targets during a conflict.
More creatively, the authors consider the advantages of a theoretical, twin-engine version of the MQ-28 Ghost Bat, with the ability to carry 12-16 GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs or two-four standoff cruise missiles. “The question is: when will this kind of capability be mature? If it’s feasible by the end of this decade, then it’s an option that warrants further consideration and potentially accelerated investment,” Hellyer and Nicholls write.
Ultimately, the report highlights the practical economic challenge created by any approach to providing a long-range strike capability, particularly for a country with a total military budget at less than 5% of annual spending by the U.S. Defense Department. This fiscal reality drove the authors to concede there may be a better option for Australia than buying B-21s.
“There is potentially a way for Australia to have its cake and eat it too: by hosting USAF B-21s,” the authors write.
